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ABSTRACT
This paper identifies which types of patients and hospitals have abusive Medicare billings that are
responsive to law enforcement. For a 20 percent random sample of elderly Medicare beneficiaries
hospitalized from 1994-98 with one or more of six illnesses that are prone to abuse, we obtain
longitudinal claims data linked with Social Security death records, hospital characteristics, and
state/year-level anti-fraud enforcement efforts. We show that increased enforcement leads certain














Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
7500 Security Boulevard
Baltimore, MD 21244-1850
and NBER  3
1.  INTRODUCTION 
  
  Anecdotal evidence suggests that there is significant fraud and abuse in the Medicare and 
Medicaid programs.  Asymmetries of information about the health conditions of and the medical 
treatment received by beneficiaries, combined with the programs’ interest in offering wide 
access to patients and prompt compensation to providers, make health insurance claims 
reimbursement a breeding ground for illicit activity.  Sparrow (2000) catalogues an extensive list 
of such behavior, including billing for services never provided; billing individually for services 
that should have been provided as part of a bundle warranting a single, lower payment; 
“upcoding” marginal patients to having had a related but more complex illness or treatment in 
order to obtain higher reimbursement; and providing services that were not medically necessary.   
Although there are no agreed-upon estimates of the magnitude of the problem,
1 the US 
Department of Health and Human Services (US HHS) has estimated “improper” Medicare fee-
for-service payments at approximately $12 to $23 billion, or approximately 7 to 14 percent of all 
reimbursements.   
  There is also anecdotal evidence that health care fraud and abuse are responsive to 
enforcement efforts.  For example, hospitals reported fewer cases of “complex” versus “simple” 
pneumonia cases among Medicare beneficiaries in 1998 than they did in 1997 and 1996, where 
complex cases receive a higher reimbursement (Birch 2000).  This occurred contemporaneously 
with the 1997 investigation by the New York Times and the US Government into 
Columbia/HCA’s coding practices for this illness, and the release of Government guidelines for 
hospital coding compliance programs.   
Yet, despite these facts, little research has used observational data to investigate how the 
cost and quality of medical care responds to enforcement.  Most existing work uses audit data to 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., GAO (2000a) which makes this point.   4
identify the aggregate amount of abuse, or the characteristics of hospitals or patients associated 
with abuse.  This omission is important for several reasons.  First, the existing literature’s focus 
on audit data, which are costly to obtain (both in financial and political terms),
2 has severely 
limited its scope; methods that can guide enforcement based on observational data only offer an 
important practical advantage.  Second, from a policy perspective, optimal targeting of 
enforcement requires estimates of the effects on cost and quality of the interaction between 
enforcement and patient or hospital characteristics, not estimates of the correlation between 
characteristics and the level of abusive billings.  Third, from the perspective of economic theory, 
estimates of how enforcement affects the care for different types of patients, and the care 
supplied at different types of organizations, are at least as important as estimates of the effect of 
patient and provider characteristics on the level of fraud and abuse.  For example, if managers of 
nonprofit hospitals value their reputation for supplying “socially responsible” medical care more 
than do managers of for-profit hospitals, then the response to enforcement of fraud and abuse at 
nonprofits could be greater than the response at for-profits, regardless of the overall level of 
fraud and abuse at nonprofits versus for-profits.   
This paper seeks to fill this gap.  We match longitudinal data on the health expenditures, 
days in the hospital, and outcomes of a 20 percent random sample of Medicare beneficiaries 
from 1994-1998 with illnesses that are particularly prone to fraud and abuse; data on the 
characteristics of all U.S. general acute care hospitals; and data on states’ Medicaid anti-fraud 
enforcement expenditures.   We estimate the effects of enforcement on levels of and differences 
between types of patients and hospitals in treatment intensity and health outcomes.  We conclude 
that increased enforcement leads to declines in abusive treatment either if expenditures decline in 
                                                 
2 See, for example, the discussion in GAO (1996) of the effect of political pressure from Congress and interest 
groups on IRS’s decision to postpone its intensive random Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program audits.   5
response to enforcement, with no accompanying increase in the rate of adverse health outcomes, 
or if the rate of adverse outcomes declines in response to enforcement, with no accompanying 
increase in expenditures.
3 
We seek to distinguish the effects of enforcement on purely financial behavior from its 
effects on medical treatment decisions, because the latter may have far greater social costs.  
Financial misconduct involves only a transfer of resources from the government to private 
parties (and therefore a deadweight loss equal to the cost of public funds), whereas enforcement-
induced changes in treatment involve the allocation of real resources.  Furthermore, 
enforcement-induced declines in the intensity of medical care that has minimal outcome benefits 
save patients the substantial nonfinancial costs of invasive treatment, and enforcement-induced 
improvements in the quality of care provide patients with longer lives and better health.  To 
distinguish between these two effects, we first estimate the effects of enforcement on health 
outcomes such as mortality and readmission with complications.  Then, we estimate the effect of 
enforcement on the total days in the acute care hospital, to provide at least a coarse nonfinancial 
measure of the real resources used to treat a given episode of illness.  
Our analysis has four important limitations that we discuss in detail below.  First, because 
we do not observe whether services were actually provided, we cannot distinguish between 
activity meeting the legal definition of fraud (which may or may not include the actual delivery 
of health care) and that meeting the legal definition of abuse (which generally involves the 
delivery of unnecessary care).  For convenience, we describe our work as testing for abusive 
                                                 
3 In models of the effects of enforcement on differences between types of patients and hospitals, we 
conclude that increased enforcement leads to greater declines in abusive treatment for a given type of patient or 
hospital either if expenditures for that type of patient or hospital decline by more in response to enforcement than do 
the expenditures of the complementary type, with no accompanying differential increase in the rate of adverse health 
outcomes, or if the rate of adverse outcomes for that type of patient or hospital declines by more in response to 
enforcement than does the rate of the complementary type, with no accompanying differential increase in 
expenditures.     6
behavior.  Second, we assume that Medicaid enforcement affects the extent of Medicare abuse, 
based on the administrative overlap between the agencies responsible for policing the Medicaid 
and Medicare programs.  Third, we classify treatment behavior as abusive if it has no significant 
measured consequences for patient health.  If we neglect to measure important health benefits of 
a given form of treatment – for example, the rapidity and/or completeness of recovery 
attributable to rehabilitation in a skilled nursing facility – then we may classify hospitals that 
supply such treatment as abusive even though they are providing valuable services to their 
patients.  
Fourth, we make two assumptions in order to ensure that our estimates of the 
responsiveness of billings to enforcement are lower bounds for the true effects.  First, we assume 
that states with high levels of abuse invest at least as much in enforcement as do states with low 
levels of abuse, and that states target enforcement towards those types of patients or hospitals 
with more severe abuse problems.  This enables us to sign any bias due to the endogeneity of 
enforcement.  Second, we assume that unobservably sicker patients are at least as likely to 
choose high-billing types of hospitals in high enforcement states versus low enforcement states.  
This enables us to sign any bias due to unobserved patient heterogeneity across hospitals. 
  This paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 provides some background on corruption, 
fraud, and abuse and a review of the empirical literature.  Section 3 presents our models.  This 
section describes how we identify the effects of fraud control expenditures and hospital and 
patient characteristics on upcoding, treatment intensity and health outcomes.  Section 4 discusses 
our data sources.  Section 5 presents our results and section 6 concludes by discussing the 
implications of our findings. 
   7
2.  CORRUPTION, FRAUD, AND ABUSE:  BACKGROUND  
  Commentators have long acknowledged theoretically that corruption can have substantial 
effects on social welfare (e.g., Rose-Ackerman 1975, Shleifer and Vishny 1993).  Existing 
empirical work on the effects of corruption (reviewed in Duggan and Levitt 2000) spans a wide 
range of topics, including studies of tax compliance and tax evasion,
4 of the extent and 
determinants of bid rigging in public contracting (e.g., Porter and Zona 1993), of the effects of 
government influence-peddling on firms’ stock prices and macroeconomic outcomes (e.g., 
Fisman 2000, Mauro 1995), and of teacher cheating on standardized testing of secondary school 
students (Jacob and Levitt 2001).   
But despite the importance of corruption in health care, due to the prevalence of third-
party payment systems and the sheer size of the sector, little empirical research has investigated 
how enforcement affects the cost and quality of medical care.  Most of the investigation into the 
extent and determinants of health care fraud and abuse has been based on audit studies done by 
the Office of the Inspector General of US HHS (HHS OIG).  One arm of this work, discussed in 
the introduction, estimates the magnitude of improper Medicare fee-for-service payments (HHS 
OIG 2001).   In these studies, medical review personnel from the Health Care Financing 
Administration’s (HCFA)
5 Medicare contractors compare all of the claims from a stratified 
random cross-section of 600 beneficiaries to the beneficiaries’ medical records.   The studies 
conclude that improper payments – which include payments for noncovered services, services 
billed without documentation, coding errors, and medically unnecessary services -- ranged from 
$23.2 billion in 1996 to $11.9 billion in 2000, or 14 percent to 6.8 percent of Medicare fee-for-
                                                 
4 Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (1990) and Engel, Galetovic, and Raddatz (2001) estimate the correlation between 
enforcement efforts and tax revenues to identify the magnitude of tax evasion; Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein 1998 
provide a comprehensive review of this literature. 
5 Now called the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).   8
service payments.  As HHS and many analysts have observed, these estimates may be either an 
overstatement or an understatement of the total amount of fraud and abuse.  The total volume of 
improper payments likely includes waste and errors that are neither fraudulent nor abusive; and, 
because the estimates are obtained by comparing bills submitted to HCFA with retrospective 
review of patient records, they exclude any fraudulent or abusive billings substantiated by 
medical records, even if the medical records were themselves inaccurate or deceptive.
6   Psaty et 
al. (1999) extend the HHS OIG approach by comparing Medicare bills to information collected 
from both medical records and patient interviews.  Based on this information, they conclude that 
37.5 percent of all heart failure cases reflect incorrect diagnoses, so that fraudulent and abusive 
coding of heart failure alone cost Medicare as much as $933 million in 1993.   
A second set of audit studies seeks to identify the determinants of fraud and abuse, in 
particular to identify observable characteristics of providers or claims associated with fraudulent 
or abusive behavior.  HHS OIG (1998c) compares audits of a sample of claims from 50 hospitals 
considered to be likely abusers with audits of claims from a random sample of 20 hospitals.  It 
reports both the 10 diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) with the highest rates of upcoding – 
classification of marginal patients as having had a related but more complex condition or 
treatment than was actually the case to obtain greater reimbursement -- and the characteristics of 
hospitals and patient populations associated with upcoding.  Swedlow et al. (1992) apply a 
similar methodology to calculate rates of inappropriate use of MRI among physicians who self-
refer for imaging versus physicians who independently refer.   
                                                 
6 However, the HHS OIG estimates likely understate the total amount of fraud and abuse. The 
proportionately low levels of expenditures to investigate fraud and abuse are consistent with high equilibrium levels 
of such behavior.  Medicare “benefit integrity” funding, which finances fraud control units and the handling of 
beneficiary complaints of fraud, was just $78 million in FY2000, or 0.03 percent of total program spending.  
Similarly, spending on Medicaid fraud Control Units amounted to approximately 0.07 percent of total Medicaid 
spending in FY2000. (Sparrow 2000, p. 73) 
   9
A handful of studies seek to use observational data to identify types of hospitals or 
physicians that behave abusively.  Hillman et al. (1990) and GAO (1994) show that physicians 
who have a financial interest in imaging facilities are more likely to order imaging services than 
physicians who do not.  HHS OIG (1998b, 1999abc) explain how to identify hospitals with 
atypically high rates of billing for certain high-reimbursement DRGs that are thought to be prone 
to upcoding.  Silverman and Skinner (2001) extend this approach, investigating whether for-
profit hospitals and the area density of for-profit hospitals is correlated with upcoding of patients 
with certain illnesses.  They find that for-profit hospitals are more likely to engage in upcoding 
behavior than most non-profit hospitals, but that the upcoding behavior of non-profits more 
closely resembles the behavior of for-profits in markets in which for-profits account for a high 
share of patient discharges.   
Previous empirical research shows the tradeoffs between existing uses of audit-based and 
observational data.  By construction, the audit studies provide consistent estimates of the 
magnitude of and types of claims and providers associated with improper billing.  But because of 
the high cost of medical record reviews, the audit studies’ small samples limit the power with 
which they can identify precisely the types of patients, illnesses, and providers prone to abuse.  
Studies using observational data, on the other hand, use very large samples to identify precisely 
differences in billing behavior by individual hospital or hospital type.  But because observational 
data contains information only on total billings (or some variant thereof, such as the patient’s 
probability of being coded into a high-reimbursement DRG), reported correlations between 
patient or provider characteristics and billings could be due to differences in fraud or abuse, or to 
differences in valid billings across provider types.  Distinguishing fraud or abuse from valid 
differences in billings across providers requires the additional assumption that there are no   10
differences across providers in their characteristics or the unobserved characteristics of their 
patients that affect valid billings – an assumption that is likely to be incorrect (e.g., Kessler and 
McClellan (2001)).  And, existing studies on observational data do not investigate the 
consequences of allegedly abusive treatment for patient health outcomes; without information on 
outcomes, classification of a pattern of treatment as abusive is necessarily speculative.  Finally, 
these studies do not provide any evidence on a key policy question of interest – how different 
types of doctors or hospitals would respond to increased enforcement.  
 
3.  EMPIRICAL MODELS 
  We examine the impact of Medicaid fraud control expenditures that are determined at the 
state level, individual patient characteristics, and the characteristics of hospital of initial 
admission on upcoding, hospital expenditures, length of stay, and health outcomes using 
longitudinal data on cohorts of elderly Medicare recipients who were hospitalized with one or 
more of six types of illness between 1994 and 1998.   We use variation in state-level Medicaid 
enforcement to identify the responsiveness of Medicare abuse to enforcement because of 
extensive administrative overlap between the agencies responsible for policing the Medicaid and 
Medicare programs (see HHS OIG 2000).  State Medicaid agencies are required to report all 
suspected incidences of provider fraud to their state’s Medicaid Fraud Control Units (MFCUs) 
through a unified sub-system (Surveillance and Utilization Review Sub-system) of their 
Medicaid Management Information Systems.
7  The MFCUs have developed uniform procedures 
to coordinate their efforts with HHS OIG through the National Association of Medicaid Fraud 
Control Units (Jost and Davies 2000, p. 369). 
                                                 
7 MFCUs were created as part of the 1978 Medicare/Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments.   11
More importantly, HHS OIG formally oversees the state MFCUs as well as Medicare 
fraud enforcement efforts.  HHS OIG’s authority to conduct coordinated investigations of fraud 
and abuse across programs has been strengthened by laws passed both during and after our study 
period.  The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 established a National 
Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Program under the joint direction of the Attorney General 
and the Secretary of HHS, acting through HHS OIG.  And, The Ticket to Work and Work 
Incentives Improvement Act of 1999 allows state MFCUs in certain circumstances to investigate 
fraud in the Medicare program if the case is “primarily related to Medicaid.”   
  In 3-digit zip code k during year t =1, …, T, the observational units in our analysis of the 
effects of fraud control expenditures on upcoding, expenditures, length of stay, and outcomes 
consist of individuals i = 1, …, Nkt who are initially admitted to hospital j with a new occurrence 
of a given type of illness.  Each patient has a vector of characteristics Xit: four age indicator 
variables (70-74 years, 75-79 years, 80-89 years, and 90-99 years; omitted group is 65-69 years), 
gender, and black/non-black race; a set of interaction effects between age, gender, and race; and 
an indicator variable denoting whether the patient had been admitted to the hospital in the 365 
days prior to the onset of the study illness, to capture the overall status of the patient’s health 
upon admission to the hospital.  Each patient also has a vector of indicator variables Zjt that 
describes the characteristics of their hospital of initial admission (e.g., for-profit ownership and 
size).  In all model specifications we include year-fixed-effects that are allowed to vary by size 
of metropolitan area.  We also include patient-diagnosis-group fixed effects that we allow to vary 
by patient-3-digit zip-code, to control for patients’ initial health conditions and heterogeneity 
across geographic areas in treatment patterns.  We group patients into 72 diagnosis groups based 
on their ICD-9 code on admission (in practice, the vast majority of patients with a given type of   12
illness will be classified into a small subset of these groups).  Finally, depending on their state of 
residence and year of admission, each patient is subject to a given level of enforcement, as 
measured by ln(Medicaid fraud control unit expenditures per general medical, non-federal 
hospital) or ln(Medicaid fraud control unit expenditures per Medicare beneficiary), Pkt.   
We measure four types of outcomes.  The binary variable Cit is set equal to 1 if the 
individual is coded into the highest-paid DRG of the set of DRGs into which a patient with a 
particular illness could be coded, 0 otherwise.  The individual incurs total Medicare bills of Yit, 
(where Y is total expenditures in the year after and including the admission to the hospital for the 
study illness) in connection with total days in the acute care hospital Lit (where L includes the all 
days in the hospital in the year after and including the day of initial hospitalization).  We identify 
separately inpatient acute, inpatient nonacute (largely skilled nursing), outpatient, and home 
health/hospice utilization.   The patient has health outcome Oit, where O = 1 denotes an adverse 
health outcome in the 365 days following the initial hospital admission, 0 otherwise. 
We estimate linear versions of the model suggested by our theory, which are of the form: 
     Cit 
   ln(Yit) 
            ln(Lit) = αkDit + σtMk + Xitφ + Zjtγ + Pktβ + εikt      ( 1 )  
                 Oit 
And 
    Cit 
   ln(Yit) 
            ln(Lit) = αkDit + σtMk + Xitφ + Zjtγ + Pktβ + Xit*Pktδ + Zjt*Pktθ + εikt    (2) 
                 Oit 
where αk is a 3-digit zip-code fixed-effect; Dit is a 71-dimensional vector of indicator variables 
denoting individual i’s diagnosis; σt is a time fixed effect; Mk is a six-dimensional vector of   13
indicator variables denoting the size of individual i’s MSA (including one group for individuals 
who do not live in an MSA); and εikt is an error term, where E(εikt|…) = 0.   
The coefficients of interest are β, δ, and θ which reflect the responsiveness and the 
difference in responsiveness by patient and hospital type to enforcement of billings or health 
outcomes.  We define hospitals with characteristic Z
1 as providing abusive treatment that is more 
responsive to enforcement if θ
1 < 0 in models of Y and/or C, and θ
1 ≤ 0 in models of O – that is, 
billings of hospitals of type Z
1 = 1 compared to hospitals of type Z
1 = 0 are significantly more 
negatively responsive to state Medicaid fraud control expenditures, and the enforcement-induced 
reduction in treatment associated with that decrease in billings (if any) has no significant adverse 
consequences for patient health outcomes.  Similar tests can be constructed to investigate 
whether certain types of patients receive abusive treatment that is more responsive to 
enforcement, and whether the quality of care improves by more at certain types of hospitals, with 
no accompanying increase in expenditures.   
We make two assumptions in order to ensure that our estimates of the responsiveness of 
billings to enforcement are lower bounds (in absolute value) for the true effects.  First, we 
assume that states with high levels of abuse invest at least as much in enforcement as do states 
with low levels of abuse, and that states target enforcement towards those types of patients or 
hospitals with more severe abuse problems.  Suppose state s at time t had a high level of abuse, 
either among all hospitals or among a particular type of hospital (e.g., hospitals of type Z
1 = 1 
submit more abusive bills than do hospitals of type Z
1 = 0).   If this led state s to invest more in 
enforcement in aggregate – the most likely type of simultaneity bias – then estimates of $ from 
equation (1) would be biased upward, i.e. downward in absolute value.  Similarly, if hospitals’   14
behavior led state s to target hospitals of type Z
1 = 1 because they were abusive, then estimates 
of θ
1 would be biased upward, i.e. downward in absolute value, for the same reason. 
Second, we assume that unobservably sicker patients are at least as likely to choose high-
billing types of hospitals in high enforcement states versus low enforcement states.   If high 
levels of enforcement mitigate both adverse cost and adverse quality consequences of abuse, then 
unobservably sicker patients would be more willing to choose high-billing hospitals in high 
enforcement states, and estimates of θ
1 would be biased upward, i.e. downward in absolute 
value.  But if high levels of enforcement lead to reductions in intensive treatment that patients 
value, and sicker patients value enforcement-induced reductions in intensive treatment more than 
do healthy patients, then unobservably sicker patients would be less willing to choose high-
billing hospitals in high-enforcement states, and estimates of θ
1 would be biased downward, i.e. 
upward in absolute value.   
 
4.  DATA 
  We examine the response of abusive behavior to enforcement in patients with a new 
occurrence of one or more of six illnesses identified by HCFA contractors (HHS OIG 1998c) as 
being particularly vulnerable to fraud and abuse:  respiratory infections and pneumonia (DRG 
79, 80, 89, 90); chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) and generalized respiratory 
disorders (DRG 87, 88, 96, 97, 99, 100, 101, 102); circulatory system disorders (DRG 132, 133, 
138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 144, 145); kidney disorders/renal failure (DRG 326, 331, 332); diabetes 
and nutritional/metabolic disorders (DRG 182, 294, 296, 297); and cerebrovascular 
disorders/stroke (DRG 12, 14, 15, 16, 17).  We define a patient as having had a new occurrence 
of illness in a given year if that patient was admitted with one of the group of DRGs associated   15
with that illness without having been admitted under any of DRGs in the group in the previous 
12 months.  Additionally, we excluded patients who were in HMOs (because claims data are not 
available for Medicare HMO patients from our study period), patients suffering from end-stage 
renal disease, and nonelderly patients. 
  We use data for the years 1994-1998 from three principal sources.  First, we use the 20 
percent Medicare Provider Analysis and Review (MEDPAR) file to construct total Medicare 
payments (including patients’ deductibles and copayments) in the year after initial admission for 
a new occurrence of illness.  We calculate acute hospital length of stay and acute inpatient, 
nonacute (primarly skilled nursing) inpatient, outpatient, and home health/hospice expenditures.
8  
Expenditures include all reimbursements (including copayments and deductibles not paid by 
Medicare) from insurance claims for all hospitalizations in the year following each patient’s 
initial admission.
9  We also tabulate whether each patient received acute hospital care in the 365 
days prior to admission for his study illness, as a measure of the patient’s health status on entry 
to the study cohort.  We measure the occurrence of complications with a variable indicating 
whether the patient was readmitted within one year with a DRG in the same illness group.
10  
Data on patient demographic characteristics were obtained from the Health Care Financing 
Administration’s HISKEW enrollment files, with death dates based on death reports validated by 
                                                 
8 For patients with no nonacute care, outpatient, or home health/hospice expenditures in the year after admission, we 
set the logarithm of the respective variable to 0.  Future work could estimate the models of ln(expenditures) with 
Tobit or could estimate separately the determinants of zero/nonzero expenditures and ln(expenditures) conditional 
on expenditures > 0. 
9 Because Medicare’s diagnosis-related group (DRG) payment system for hospitals appears to compensate hospitals 
on a fixed-price basis per admission for treatment, and Medicare does not bargain with individual hospitals, 
enforcement might appear to be irrelevant to Medicare patients’ hospital expenditures.  However, the intensity of 
treatment of most health problems varies enormously, and the DRG system contains important elements of cost 
sharing (e.g., McClellan 1997).  Thus, for most health problems, hospitals and physicians that provide more 
intensive treatment can receive considerable additional payments. 
10 We exclude readmissions within 30 days, which may represent a continuation of the initial course of treatment.   16
the Social Security Administration.  We used these death dates to create a one-year mortality 
indicator variable.  
  Our second principal data source is the comprehensive information on U.S. hospital 
characteristics provided by the annual American Hospital Association (AHA) Survey.  We 
restrict our sample to nonfederal hospitals that ever reported providing general medical or 
surgical services.   From the survey we obtain information on hospital ownership type, size, 
teaching status, system membership, and other characteristics that might affect the incentives of 
the hospital and its managers.  We classify hospitals into three ownership categories (nonprofit, 
for-profit, and public (the omitted group)) and two size categories (small (<100 beds) and large 
(the omitted group)).  We classify hospitals as teaching hospitals if they report at least twenty 
full-time residents. We also represent whether the hospital is a member of a multihospital system 
with an indicator reflecting system membership (see Madison (2001) for details on the 
construction of our system variable).  Finally, we measure whether the hospital participates in a 
physician-hospital organization (PHO),
11 and whether the hospital provides skilled nursing 
care,
12 home health and hospice services,
13 or any outpatient services.  Integration by hospitals 
into related markets such as skilled nursing care may create opportunities both for enhanced cost-
effectiveness (e.g., Robinson 1996) and for abuse of the Medicare reimbursement system (e.g., 
Banks et al. 2001), so the effect of the interaction between ownership structure and enforcement 
is theoretically indeterminate.  Data on hospital characteristics are matched to individual patients 
based on the hospital to which the patient was initially admitted. 
                                                 
11 A physician-hospital organization is a joint venture between the hospital and members of the medical staff that 
may act as a unified agent in managed care contracting, own a managed care plan, own and operate ambulatory care 
centers or ancillary services projects, or provide administrative services to physician members. 
12 Skilled nursing care is defined as nonacute services provided under the supervision of a licensed registered nurse 
on a 24-hour basis. 
13 Home health services include any health-related services provided at the patient’s residence; hospice is defined as 
any program providing palliative care for terminally ill patients in either an inpatient setting or at the patient’s 
residence.   17
  Finally, we match our patient level data with state MFCU expenditures, as reported in 
HHS OIG (1995, 1997, 1998a, 2000).  These expenditures serve as a proxy for overall anti-fraud 
enforcement efforts at the state level.  The MFCU program matches state funding of the units 
with federal funding at a ratio of 3-to-1.  As of 1997, 47 states participated in the program.  
There was substantial variation in spending per beneficiary from state to state, and most states 
invested well below the cap on matching funds (0.25 percent of program costs).  We construct 
the measures of enforcement used in analysis by dividing total fraud control expenditures paid by 
the Federal government by the number of general medical, nonfederal hospitals and by the 
number of Medicare beneficiaries in the state.  Appendix table 1 reports each state’s average 
MFCU expenditures per hospital and per beneficiary for the 1994-98 period in 1995 constant 
dollars.  For purposes of calculating the logarithm of enforcement expenditures in the regression 
models below, we recode states with no expenditures as having $1 in enforcement on a per 
hospital basis and $0.10 in enforcement on a per patient basis.   
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for patients in each of the six illness groups for the 
study years 1994-1998.  The table underscores the seriousness of illness suffered by our study 
patients.  Study patients had Medicare hospital expenditures in the year after the onset of illness 
of $13,807 (circulatory disorders) to $17,301 (cerebrovascular disorders and stroke) (1995 
constant dollars).  One-year mortality rates ranged from 15.8 percent (circulatory disorders) to 
37.9 percent (pneumonia and respiratory infections).  Slightly less than half of patients had an 
acute care hospital admission in the year prior to their study illness.  The table also shows the 
tremendous variation in intensity of treatment received by a patient with a given illness.  Even 
patients with relatively well-defined illnesses such as cerebrovascular disorders and stroke 
experienced tremendous variation in their hospital utilization.  The distribution of patients across   18
hospital types, such as for-profit versus nonprofit hospitals, roughly resembles the distribution of 
hospital beds in the US (e.g., Hansmann, Kessler, and McClellan 2002).   
 
5.  RESULTS 
Table 2 presents estimates and standard errors of β from equation (1), the effects on 
billings, length of stay, and outcomes of state anti-fraud enforcement efforts, holding constant 
the characteristics of individuals and their hospitals of initial admission.  The standard errors in 
Table 2 and all subsequent tables are based on an estimator of the variance-covariance matrix 
that is consistent in the presence of heteroscedasticity and of any correlation or grouping of 
regression errors within states over time.  According to the table, enforcement generally has an 
economically and statistically insignificant estimated total effect on hospital utilization and 
health outcomes.  For example, a one percent increase in Medicare fraud control unit 
expenditures per hospital leads to an statistically insignificant .04 percent increase in acute care 
hospital expenditures (coefficients in Table 2 and all subsequent tables are multiplied by 100 for 
ease of interpretation).  However, if state/years with high levels of abuse invest more in 
enforcement, then estimates of β will be biased upward, i.e. toward zero.  Because this is the 
likely direction of any bias from endogeneity, our results provide neither a useful estimate of the 
marginal payoff of an enforcement dollar nor a powerful rejection of a null effect. 
Tables 3 and 4 present estimates and standard errors of β, δ, and θ from equation (2), the 
effects on billings, length of stay, and outcomes of state anti-fraud enforcement efforts by type of 
patient and hospital, holding all else constant.  Table 3 presents estimates of the effect of fraud 
control unit expenditures per hospital; table 4 presents estimates of the effect of fraud control 
unit expenditures per beneficiary.  The top panels of the tables highlight the differential   19
responsiveness to enforcement of the Medicare utilization of certain types of patients.  Increased 
enforcement has greater negative effects on the acute and especially the nonacute expenditures of 
young (age < 80) male patients.  In models that measure enforcement on a per hospital basis 
(table 3), a 1 percent increase in enforcement leads to an approximately .92 percent 
(=.465+.285+.165) decrease in the acute inpatient expenditures of a young male patient without a 
prior year’s hospital admission, relative to the expenditures of an older, more infirm female 
patient.  A 1 percent increase in enforcement leads to a significantly greater (5.55 percent = 
.833+3.002+1.712) relative decline in nonacute inpatient expenditures for the same population.  
Increased enforcement also has greater negative effects on the home health/hospice expenditures 
of black versus non-black patients. 
There is little systematic evidence of relative increases in rates of adverse health 
outcomes from these enforcement-induced reductions in care.  Although the greater 
enforcement-induced decline in acute expenditures for healthier patients is accompanied by a 
greater increase in relative mortality rates in one specification (table 4), younger male patients 
show a statistically significantly greater decline in readmission rates in response to enforcement 
in both specifications (tables 3 and 4).    
Taken together, these findings are consistent with the hypothesis that greater 
enforcement-induced reductions in expenditures occur in patient populations for whom 
additional treatment would be of more marginal benefit.  Younger male elderly patients are more 
likely to have a living spouse (US Department of Commerce 1999), and healthier patients are 
easier to rehabilitate at home.  Thus, healthier young male patients may be more able to 
substitute informal for formal inpatient care.     20
The bottom panels of the tables highlight the differential responsiveness to enforcement 
of different types of hospitals.  In both specifications, increased enforcement leads to statistically 
significantly greater declines in acute expenditures for patients who are initially admitted to a 
for-profit hospital, compared to patients initially admitted to a public hospital.  Increased 
enforcement also leads to statistically significantly greater declines in acute expenditures for 
patients who are initially admitted to a nonprofit hospital, compared to patients initially admitted 
to a public hospital.  The for-profit/public gap in the responsiveness of acute expenditures is 
statistically significantly greater than the nonprofit/public gap, i.e., increased enforcement leads 
to statistically significantly greater declines in acute expenditures for patients initially admitted 
to for-profit versus nonprofit hospitals (T-statistics on the for-profit/nonprofit difference in 
responsiveness, not reported in the tables, are 2.01 and 2.96 for tables 3 and 4 respectively).  For 
patients initially admitted to a for-profit hospital, this takes the form of upcoding, i.e., initially 
admitting patients into the highest-reimbursement DRG in their illness group.  Increases in 
enforcement lead patients initially admitted to a for-profit versus a public hospital to be 
statistically significantly less likely to be coded in the highest-reimbursement DRG. 
Increased enforcement leads to statistically significantly greater declines in nonacute 
expenditures for patients initially admitted to both for-profit (in one specification) and nonprofit 
(in both specifications) hospitals, compared to patients initially admitted to public hospitals.  The 
for-profit/public gap in nonacute care responsiveness is not statistically distinguishable from the 
nonprofit/public gap at conventional levels of significance (T-statistics on the for-profit/nonprofit 
difference in responsiveness, not reported in the tables, are .28 and .75 for tables 3 and 4 
respectively).     21
Enforcement affects the financial behavior of for-profit and nonprofit hospitals more than 
it affects our (coarse) nonfinancial measure of treatment intensity.  In neither for-profits nor 
nonprofits are enforcement-induced differential decreases in acute expenditures accompanied by 
enforcement-induced decreases in length-of-stay; in one specification, increases in enforcement 
lead to increases in the length-of-stay for patients initially admitted to a for-profit versus a public 
hospital.  There is also no evidence of harm to patient health of these enforcement-induced 
reductions in expenditures.  In one specification (table 4), increases in enforcement lead to 
decreases in relative readmission rates for patients initially admitted to both for-profit and 
nonprofit hospitals. 
Other hospital ownership characteristics are also associated with significant, systematic 
differences in responsiveness to enforcement.  First, the care of patients initially admitted to a 
hospital that participates in a PHO is more responsive to enforcement than the care of patients 
initially admitted to a hospital that does not.  Increases in enforcement lead to greater decreases 
in acute expenditures, acute length-of-stay, nonacute expenditures, and (in one specification) 
outpatient expenditures for patients initially admitted to a PHO hospital.  In one specification, 
increases in enforcement lead to greater decreases in upcoding in PHO hospitals; in the other 
specification, increases in enforcement lead to greater decreases in readmission rates in PHO 
hospitals.  These empirical findings are consistent with the concern that PHOs may provide a 
vehicle for hospitals to disguise illegal compensation to physicians for referrals (see, e.g., 
Blumstein 1996a and the work cited there).   
Second, in one specification, increases in enforcement lead to statistically significantly 
greater decreases in nonacute expenditures for patients who are initially admitted to a hospital 
that owns a skilled nursing facility (SNF), compared to patients initially admitted to a hospital   22
that does not.  This is consistent with the fact that the vast majority of nonacute expenditures are 
for SNF admissions, and with widespread concern over wasteful use of SNF and other post-acute 
care in the 1990s (MEDPAC 2001).
14   
Third, increases in enforcement lead to significantly greater increases in outpatient 
expenditures and significantly greater decreases in home health expenditures (in one 
specification) for patients initially admitted to hospitals that have integrated into markets for 
related services, compared to stand-alone hospitals.  In particular, increases in enforcement lead 
to greater increases in outpatient expenditures for patients initially admitted to a hospital that 
owns an outpatient or (in one specification) a home health/hospice facility, and to greater 
decreases in home health expenditures (in one specification) for patients initially admitted to a 
hospital that owns an outpatient or skilled nursing facility.  At least for outpatient and home 
health/hospice, different forms of integration have similar effects on hospitals’ responsiveness to 
enforcement.  In addition, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that enforcement alters 
the setting in which patients receive care, such as rehabilitation, that can be provided on an in-
hospital or at-home basis.   
Finally, hospital size, teaching, and system status affect responsiveness to enforcement.  
Small, non-teaching hospitals’ patients’ nonacute care expenditures decline by more in response 
to enforcement, but large hospitals’ patients’ acute care and home health/hospice expenditures 
decline by more in response to enforcement.  System and independent hospitals’ patients’ 
expenditures are similarly responsive to enforcement, but system hospitals’ patients’ length of 
stay declines by more in response to enforcement, consistent with the hypothesis that subjecting 
one member of a hospital system to scrutiny affects the behavior of other members of the system.   
                                                 
14 Indeed, in response to these concerns, Congress completely changed the reimbursement system for post-acute care 
as part of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, adopting a (more high-powered) prospective payment system for SNF 
and other post-acute care.   23
The elasticities reported in tables 3 and 4 imply very large differences in responsiveness 
to enforcement by patient and hospital type.  For example, based on the estimates in table 3, a 1 
percent or $173 increase in Medicaid enforcement expenditures per hospital (based on a sample 
average of $17,313) translates into a .267 percent or $31 decrease in the relative acute care 
expenditures for each patient initially admitted to a hospital that participates in a PHO (based on 
a sample average of $11,580).  The differential effects of enforcement on patients by age, 
gender, and illness, and for patients initially admitted to for-profit or nonprofit versus public 
hospitals, are even larger.   
There is some limited evidence of adverse outcome consequences of enforcement-
induced reductions in treatment.   We estimated models analogous to (2) separately for patients 
with each of the six study illnesses.  Results not presented in the tables show, for example, that 
for patients with circulatory disorders, enforcement-induced declines in the relative intensity of 
acute care provided after initial admission to a hospital that participates in a PHO are 
accompanied by statistically significant increases in the relative mortality rate.  However, for 
other illnesses, enforcement-induced reductions in treatment are accompanied by improvements 
in outcomes.  For patients with COPD and generalized respiratory disorders, enforcement-
induced declines in the relative intensity of acute care provided after initial admission to a 
hospital that participates in a PHO are accompanied by statistically significant decreases in the 
relative mortality rate.   
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that fraud and abuse in health care reimbursement systems 
are both widespread and responsive to law enforcement efforts.  Understanding how the care   24
provided to different types of patients, and the care supplied by different types of hospitals, 
responds to enforcement is important both to develop efficient fraud control policies and to test 
between competing economic theories of organizations.  Despite this, little research has used 
observational data for this purpose.     
This paper seeks to fill this gap by identifying the types of patients (hospitals) who 
receive (supply) abusive medical treatment that is most responsive to enforcement.  For a 20 
percent random sample of elderly Medicare beneficiaries hospitalized between 1994 and 1998 
with one or more of six illnesses -- respiratory infections and pneumonia, COPD and generalized 
respiratory disorders, circulatory system disorders, kidney disorders and renal failure, diabetes 
and nutritional/metabolic disorders, and cerebrovascular disorders and stroke – we obtain 
longitudinal claims data linked with Social Security death records, hospital characteristics, and 
state/year-level anti-fraud enforcement efforts.  We conclude that increased enforcement leads to 
greater declines in the abusive treatment of a given type of patient or hospital either if the 
expenditures of that type of patient or hospital decline by more in response to enforcement than 
do the expenditures of the complementary type, with no accompanying differential increase in 
the rate of adverse health outcomes, or if the rate of adverse outcomes of that type of patient or 
hospital declines by more in response to enforcement than does the rate of the complementary 
type, with no accompanying differential increase in expenditures.   
We find significant differences in the effects of enforcement across types of patients and 
hospitals.  Healthy young male patients’ acute care expenditures decline by more in response to 
states’ anti-fraud enforcement efforts, as compared to the expenditures of their more infirm, 
older, female counterparts.  Patients initially admitted to certain types of hospitals also 
systematically receive enforcement-sensitive treatment:  the expenditures of patients initially   25
admitted to both for-profit and nonprofit hospitals are more responsive to enforcement than those 
of patients admitted to public hospitals; the expenditures of patients initially admitted to 
hospitals that participate in a PHO are more responsive to enforcement than those of patients 
admitted to hospitals that do not; and the nonacute expenditures of patients initially admitted to 
hospitals that own a SNF are more responsive to enforcement than those of patients admitted to 
hospitals that do not.  In the case of for-profit and nonprofit hospitals, enforcement affects 
financial measures of treatment intensity more than it affects nonfinancial measures; but in the 
case of PHO hospitals, enforcement has significant effects on both financial and nonfinancial 
measures.  None of the effects of enforcement on treatment are accompanied by systematic or 
substantial effects on patient health outcomes. 
These results are unlikely to be due to endogeneity of enforcement or unobserved patient 
heterogeneity across states or hospitals.  As long as hospital types more prone to abuse receive 
more attention from law enforcement, the endogeneity of enforcement would tend to bias the 
magnitudes of the estimated differential responsiveness to enforcement toward zero.  Along 
these lines, there is no obvious process that would bias the results by patient type, i.e., that would 
lead to unobserved changes in the composition of male versus female patients in high-
enforcement versus low-enforcement states.  Unobserved patient heterogeneity is also unlikely to 
explain our estimated enforcement/hospital-characteristic interaction effects.  Estimated 
enforcement/patient-characteristic interaction effects suggest that increased enforcement leads to 
greater declines in treatment intensity for observably healthier patients.  If anything, this would 
suggest that the unobservably healthy -- rather than the unobservably sick -- would be less 
willing to choose high-billing hospitals in high-enforcement states.  But patient selection of this 
form would tend to bias estimates of the effect of interest toward zero as well.    26
Our results by hospital type support the theoretical concerns expressed by many 
commentators.  Although the acute expenditures of patients initially admitted to a for-profit 
hospital decline by more in response to enforcement than the acute treatment of patients initially 
admitted to a nonprofit hospital, the nonacute expenditures of for-profits’ patients do not.  
However, both the acute and nonacute expenditures of the patients from for-profits and 
nonprofits are significantly more responsive to enforcement than are the expenditures of patients 
from public hospitals.  Taken with other work by two of us and by others on the effects of 
hospital organizational form on medical productivity (Kessler and McClellan 2002; Hansmann, 
Kessler, and McClellan 2002), this supports a mixed view of for-profits (and to a lesser extent 
nonprofits), as being more responsive to incentives in both socially constructive and socially 
harmful ways.  Expenditures that decline in response to enforcement are only one among many 
margins of behavior on which hospitals might operate. 
The observed negative interaction effect on expenditures of enforcement and hospital 
participation in a PHO is consistent with the enhanced moral hazard inherent in such 
arrangements.  Indeed, the objective of the vast body of law and regulation prohibiting kickbacks 
and self-referrals in the Medicare and Medicaid programs is to control such behavior (Jost and 
Davies 2001, chapters 3 and 4).  Our results confirm empirically several commentators’ 
hypothesis that widespread tolerance of questionable but technically legal behavior has led to 
cynical disregard for the spirit of these laws in practice (e.g., Blumstein 1996b).  Because many 
forms of organization that are both efficient and common practice would be prohibited by a strict 
reading of the original fraud and abuse statutes, courts, administrative agencies, and Congress 
have adopted numerous exceptions and safe harbors to the statutes, thereby providing potential 
opportunities for evasion.  For example, rental of hospital space and equipment to physician-  27
owned radiology groups in exchange for a percentage of gross receipts is a commonly accepted 
practice, even though this amounts to exactly what the law supposedly prohibits – payment for 
referrals (Hall 1988).   
The negative differential effect of enforcement on the level of nonacute expenditures for 
patients initially admitted to a hospital that owns a SNF also may be due to moral hazard on the 
part of hospitals.  However, this finding should be interpreted with caution because of the limited 
scope of the measures of health outcomes that we observe.  The consequences of intensive 
skilled nursing care – most notably, faster and more complete rehabilitation – may not be 
captured fully by our very coarse measures of outcomes, which would lead us to classify such 
expenditures as abusive even if they were socially constructive.   
More generally, the incompleteness of our measures of health outcomes substantially 
limits the welfare implications of our results; further study using more clinically detailed, audit-
based data could at least begin to address these limitations.  Audit data could also be used to 
validate our findings by investigating whether the characteristics of hospitals and patients 
identified here are actually more prone to abuse.  If these findings are valid, then they could be 
used to target intensive audits on well-defined types of hospitals and patients, which might 
improve both the efficiency and the equity of both public and private-sector efforts to detect 
illicit behavior by health care providers.   Additional analysis of observational data could explore 
in greater detail the mechanisms through which the potentially abusive behavior identified here 
might occur.   28
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Characteristics of Patients 
1-Year  Acute  Inpatient  Expenditures  (1995  $)  $11,982 $11,801 $11,461 $12,831 $10,711 $11,751 
        (standard  deviation)  (13,031) (13,883) (14,260) (14,720) (12,977) (12,735) 
1-Year Nonacute Inpatient Expenditures (1995 $)  $2,731 $1,967 $1,520 $2,929 $2,750 $4,703 
        (standard  deviation)  (7,186) (6,275) (5,429) (7,811) (7,182) (9,701) 
1-Year Outpatient Expenditures (1995 $)  $794  $745  $826  $1,129  $879  $847 
        (standard  deviation)  (1,846) (1,606) (1,770) (2,489) (1,946) (1,999) 
1-Year Home Health and Hospice Expenditures (1995 $)  $1,573  $1,731  $1,445  $2,590  $2,023  $2,110 
        (standard  deviation)  (4,680) (4,508) (4,147) (6,424) (5,396) (5,274) 
1-Year  Acute  Length  of  stay  14.45 13.71 11.21 15.19 13.50 14.58 
        (standard  deviation)  (15.24) (15.36) (14.27) (17.41) (15.87) (16.83) 
Coded  with  Highest  Reimbursement  DRG  0.271 0.112 0.071 0.696 0.401 0.648 
1-Year  mortality  rate  0.379 0.253 0.158 0.317 0.286 0.291 
1-Year  readmission  rate    0.137 0.187 0.126 0.077 0.100 0.130 
No hospital admission in year prior to illness  0.534  0.581  0.597  0.394  0.491  0.667 
Age  <  80  0.480 0.651 0.604 0.571 0.543 0.526 
Male  0.446 0.402 0.406 0.595 0.323 0.401 
Black  0.074 0.069 0.074 0.119 0.109 0.097 
        
Characteristics of Hospital of Admission        
For  –profit  0.107 0.105 0.092 0.102 0.102 0.099 
Non-profit  0.721 0.730 0.759 0.744 0.733 0.755 
Hospital  participates  in  physician/hospital  organization  0.611 0.608 0.625 0.625 0.613 0.626 
Hospital  owns  skilled  nursing  facility  0.453 0.441 0.428 0.434 0.438 0.447 
Hospital  owns  outpatient  facility  0.851 0.857 0.869 0.874 0.859 0.877 
Hospital  owns  home  health/hospice  0.650 0.644 0.640 0.634 0.641 0.648 
Small  size  (<  100  beds)  0.388 0.360 0.332 0.306 0.349 0.304 
Teaching hospital  0.166  0.163 0.195 0.223 0.185 0.200 
System  hospital  0.567 0.567 0.562 0.583 0.569 0.586 
N    383,983 241,245 387,028  25,403  310,019 330,473 
   32
 































Using ln(Medicaid fraud control expenditures per hospital) to measure enforcement 
  0.043 -0.392  -0.644** -0.307  0.090  0.017 -0.039 -0.041 
  (0.088) (0.362) (0.232) (0.459) (0.129) (0.013) (0.018) (0.031) 
Using ln(Medicaid fraud control expenditures per Medicaid beneficiary) to measure enforcement 
  0.199 -1.213 -1.354 -1.393 0.924 -0.031 -0.078 -0.107 
  (0.250) (1.100) (0.741) (1.220) (0.392) (0.040) (0.050) (0.366) 
 
Notes:  Hospital expenditures in 1995 dollars.  All coefficients multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation.  Coefficients from expenditure models are elasticities; 
coefficients from all other models are in percentage points.  Standard errors (in parentheses) are based on an estimator of the variance-covariance matrix that is 
consistent in the presence of heteroscedasticity and of any correlation or grouping of regression errors within states over time.     33
Table 3:  Differential Effects of State Medicaid Fraud Control Unit Expenditures per Hospital on Medicare Hospital 





























Ln(Medicaid  fraud  control  unit  1.325** 4.795** -2.467**  1.498  0.982** 0.148** 0.082**  0.014 
expenditures  per  hospital  (0.332) (1.131) (0.891) (1.797) (0.319) (0.049) (0.040) (0.066) 
Interactions between patient characteristics and ln(Medicaid fraud control expenditures per hospital) 
No hosp admission in  -0.465**  -0.833  -1.323  -0.915 -0.485** 0.017 -0.067** 0.043 
Prior  365d*enforcement  (0.155) (0.716) (0.955) (0.734) (0.131) (0.019) (0.028) (0.042) 
age < 80*enforcement  -0.285**  -3.002**  1.924** -0.096 -0.375*  0.030  -0.051* -0.084 
  (0.097) (0.578) (0.429) (0.560) (0.181) (0.020) (0.028) (0.044) 
male*enforcement -0.165**  -1.712**  0.597  -0.375 -0.296**  -0.029*  -0.037  -0.061 
  (0.097) (0.365) (0.348) (0.399) (0.112) (0.021) (0.036) (0.054) 
black*enforcement  -0.160 0.487 0.882  -3.735**  -0.247 -0.052 0.047 -0.073 
  (0.215) (0.568) (0.836) (1.298) (0.181) (0.033) (0.044) (0.064) 
Interactions between hospital characteristics and ln(Medicaid fraud control expenditures per hospital) 
Forprofit*enforcement -1.458**  -1.899  -1.094 1.450  0.672**  -0.106*  -0.096 -0.133 
  (0.502) (1.382) (1.028) (1.078) (0.290) (0.059) (0.071) (0.097) 
non-profit*enforcement -0.697**  -2.153**  -0.198 0.308 0.217 -0.011 -0.060 -0.004 
  (0.182) (0.924) (0.597) (0.560) (0.154) (0.031) (0.037) (0.048) 
Particip in phys/hosp   -0.267**  -1.014**  -0.881** 0.228  -0.195*  -0.030 -0.063** -0.021 
*enforcement  (0.080) (0.428) (0.377) (0.599) (0.101) (0.020) (0.032) (0.039) 
owns  skilled  nursing  -0.096 -0.690 -0.039 -0.745 -0.229 -0.012 0.009  0.062 
*high  enforcement  (0.103) (0.902) (0.614) (0.523) (0.169) (0.021) (0.034) (0.050) 
owns  outpatient  -0.114  0.127 1.413** -1.364  0.000 -0.108** 0.032  0.036 
*enforcement  (0.137) (0.491) (0.463) (0.847) (0.105) (0.042) (0.035) (0.060) 
owns  hm  health/hospice  0.086  -0.215 1.036** 0.069  0.055 0.073** 0.043 -0.069* 
*enforcement  (0.130) (0.413) (0.504) (0.332) (0.157) (0.023) (0.048) (0.038) 
small*enforcement  0.265** -1.269**  0.283  0.654** -0.143** -0.015* -0.022** -0.028** 
  (0.051) (0.188) (0.183) (0.170) (0.048) (0.009) (0.010) (0.014) 
teaching*enforcement 0.056  1.936* -1.039  0.034  -0.029 0.077** -0.027  -0.028 
  (0.331) (1.032) (0.944) (0.874) (0.229) (0.031) (0.061) (0.077) 
System*enforcement  -0.010 -0.366 0.423  0.572  -0.400**  -0.123 -0.024 0.033 
  (0.121) (0.456) (0.442) (0.401) (0.124) (0.025) (0.034) (0.046) 
N o t e s :     S e e   t a b l e   2 .             34
Table 4:  Differential Effects of State Medicaid Fraud Control Unit Expenditures per Beneficiary on Medicare Hospital 






























Ln(Medicaid fraud control unit  2.624**  6.332**  -8.925**  1.540  3.841**  0.154  0.270**  -0.155 
Expenditures  per  beneficiary  (0.656) (3.096) (2.992) (3.801) (0.905) (0.115) (0.114) (0.111) 
Interactions between patient characteristics and ln(Medicaid fraud control expenditures per beneficiary) 
No hosp admission in  -0.787**  2.061  -0.255  0.029  -0.888**  0.058  -0.111*  0.225** 
Prior  365d*enforcement  (0.313) (2.215) (3.355) (1.492) (0.307) (0.047) (0.062) (0.101) 
age < 80*enforcement  -0.825**  -5.922**  4.508** -0.085 -1.826** 0.056 -0.147** -0.048 
  (0.254) (1.671) (1.183) (1.324) (0.500) (0.045) (0.070) (0.124) 
male*enforcement -0.371*  -4.687**  1.978**  -1.160 -0.916** -0.045  -0.081 -0.269** 
  (0.216) (0.874) (0.846) (1.076) (0.269) (0.050) (0.078) (0.125) 
black*enforcement -0.227  0.355  4.784*  -12.579**  -0.359  -0.159*  0.117  -0.264 
  (0.526) (1.739) (2.566) (3.282) (0.541) (0.095) (0.109) (0.174) 
Interactions between hospital characteristics and ln(Medicaid fraud control expenditures per beneficiary) 
Forprofit*enforcement -3.982**  -6.665*  -2.475 3.732 0.779  -0.516**  -0.335*  -0.108 
  (1.006) (3.836) (3.268) (2.720) (0.739) (0.149) (0.184) (0.264) 
non-profit*enforcement  -1.731**  -4.322* 0.893  2.688  0.230  -0.025 -0.203* -0.015 
  (0.471) (2.204) (2.221) (1.767) (0.398) (0.084) (0.115) (0.129) 
Particip in phys/hosp   -0.598**  -1.670**  -0.157 1.285  -0.522*  -0.166**  -0.095 -0.071 
*enforcement  (0.273) (1.033) (0.964) (1.537) (0.307) (0.057) (0.076) (0.103) 
owns skilled nursing  -0.041  -4.590**  0.971  -2.558*  -0.761*  0.022  0.023  0.166 
*high  enforcement  (0.285) (2.012) (1.445) (1.460) (0.401) (0.057) (0.078) (0.123) 
owns  outpatient  -0.026 2.040  3.475**  -4.357**  0.172 -0.109 0.000 0.128 
*enforcement  (0.341) (1.527) (1.415) (1.902) (0.335) (0.090) (0.108) (0.156) 
owns  hm  health/hospice  0.420 1.140 0.730 -0.164  -0.221 0.049 0.143 -0.097 
*enforcement  (0.317) (1.282) (1.127) (0.983) (0.389) (0.057) (0.100) (0.100) 
small*enforcement 2.392**  -6.136**  -0.504  6.189**  -0.910*  -0.096 -0.135 -0.168 
  (0.557) (1.960) (1.840) (1.656) (0.519) (0.092) (0.098) (0.174) 
teaching*enforcement 0.112  6.919** -2.719  -3.022  0.490 0.058 -0.060 0.061 
  (0.886) (2.321) (2.302) (2.184) (0.491) (0.085) (0.128) (0.171) 
System*enforcement  -0.017 0.330 0.620 1.240  -1.059**  0.004 -0.095 0.055 
  (0.339) (1.343) (1.384) (1.159) (0.342) (0.061) (0.091) (0.121) 
Notes:  See table 2.                   35
 










Alabama $11,000  $2.16  Montana  $3,331  $1.85 
Alaska $23,415  $6.44  Nebraska $0  $0 
Arizona  $17,717 $2.04  Nevada  $31,962 $6.13 
Arkansas  $13,597 $2.79  New  Hampshire  $16,625 $4.51 
California  $20,726 $1.53  New  Jersey  $20,145 $2.06 
Colorado $8,834  $1.91  New  Mexico  $16,364  $2.10 
Connecticut  $16,393 $1.47  New  York  $97,364 $6.73 
Delaware  $80,609 $5.44  North  Carolina $11,181 $1.18 
District of Columbia  $0  $0  North Dakota  $0  $0 
Florida  $19,387 $2.14  Ohio  $12,417 $1.45 
Georgia $13,837  $1.80  Oklahoma  $5,478  $1.62 
Hawaii $43,103  $10.72  Oregon $5,388  $0.69 
Idaho $0  $0  Pennsylvania  $15,463  $2.27 
Illinois $7,817  $1.06  Rhode  Island  $58,740  $4.59 
Indiana $10,524  $2.01  South  Carolina  $8,404  $0.95 
Iowa  $3,484 $1.31  South  Dakota  $4,088 $2.68 
Kansas  $3,958 $2.00  Tennessee  $7,300 $0.64 
Kentucky  $6,942 $1.10  Texas  $5,580 $0.85 
Louisiana $7,997  $1.33  Utah  $25,008  $5.59 
Maine $8,664  $1.94  Vermont  $19,749  $2.60 
Maryland $24,791  $2.67  Virginia  $6,974  $0.95 
Massachusetts $21,680 $2.19  Washington  $10,351 $1.17 
Michigan $14,902  $1.89  West  Virginia  $7,396  $1.10 
Minnesota  $4,748 $1.32  Wisconsin  $4,010 $1.02 
Mississippi  $7,971 $1.54  Wyoming  $8,191 $4.07 
Missouri $12,646  $2.30       
Notes:  Federal Government share only.  MFCU expenditures in constant 1995 dollars. 
 
  
 